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EXCEPTIONS FOR APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant/Appellant asserts the following challenges to the
Statement of Fact set forth by the Plaintiff/Appellee:
1.

There was no

specific written Findings of Fact or

Conclusions of Law on which to base the Court's decision to deny
the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence.
2.

Although Officer Mele stated trailer 41 was "occupied" by

Teddy Kinneman, Officer Mele could not have known the trailer was
then "occupied" by anyone, let alone Kinneman, until he knocked on
the door.

He may have known Kinneman was the leaseholder of the

estate, or that the trailer belonged to Kinneman, but he could not
have

known

Kinneman

"occupied"

the

trailer

at

that

time.

Additionally, Officer Mele did not state in his testimony that he
knew Kinneman was a parolee.

This was not known, or at least

testified to, until after AP&P Officer Olsen arrived at the scene.

3.

The officers, either Law Enforcement or AP&P did not know

whether Defendant had any reason to be in the trailer or not.
Kinneman was not present in or at the trailer and Roberts and
Pimental refused to give any information regarding Defendant.
There was no information to determine whether Defendant was a
trespasser, Kinneman's brother, or a drinking buddy.
4.

The search of the vehicle was conducted simultaneously

with the arrest of Roberts. The search began prior to any possible
consent, although, as acknowledged by Plaintiff, Roberts denied
having given consent.
ARGUMENT
Point 1
DEFENDANT
APPROPRIATELY
AND
ADEQUATELY
PRESERVED AND RAISES THE ISSUES HE ARGUES,
INCLUDING
LACK
OF
CONSENT,
EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES, AND PROBABLE CAUSE.
The Trial Court ruled from the bench and denied Defendant's
Motion to Suppress.

Nevertheless, clear findings to support this

ruling were not set forth.

Appellee now attempts to use that

dearth against the Defendant by arguing that Defendant failed to
preserve or properly argue the issues raised.

It is not the

Defendant's obligation to set forth the findings on which the
Court's ruling is based.

Defendant argued at the trial level that

consent did not exist, that exigent circumstances did not exist,
and that the officers did not have probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion to conduct their searches. On appeal, Defendant properly
raises these contentions.

2

A- DEFENDANT DENIED HAVING GIVEN CONSENT AND
ARGUED SUCH DENIAL IN ITS BRIEF IN CHIEF
Defendant contended vigorously at the trial level that Roberts
denied having given consent.

In Defendant's Brief in Chief he

never concedes that consent was given.
consent

was

Defendant's

given was

at

the

arguments

that

The contention that no

very

least

neither

a

impliedly
warrant

raised

nor

by

exigent

circumstances existed and therefore the search was illegal.

If

Defendant believed consent was given, or if Defendant did not
oppose this possibility, the basis for Defendant's appeal would be
eroded.

Clearly, Defendant raised the issue in his appeal and this

issue is not waived.

Appellee has the obligation to argue Consent

and Defendant can then attack the question of Consent.

Defendant

is arguing very clearly that the search by law enforcement officers
and

AP&P

officers

instances,

is

was

legal.

illegal.
Clearly,

A

consent

Defendant's

search,
brief

in

most

raises, not

concedes, the issue of consent. Otherwise, Appellee would not have
to argue it existed.
Officer

Mele

indicated

he

requested

permission

to

"look

inside" the vehicle. Mele testified that he received permission to
"look."

The officer did that and observed weapons. He then placed

Roberts under arrest.

Later, Roberts was told that the vehicle was

now going to be searched, meaning opened and the weapons extracted.
Roberts testified that he did not consent to the search of his
vehicle.

It appears from the transcript of the trial that Roberts

was not asked whether the vehicle could be searched, but that the
3

officer explained in some detail why he was going to search the
vehicle.

While Roberts may have given permission to "look" in the

vehicle, that does not extend into consent to search the vehicle.
He has already indicated the vehicle did not belong to him, but to
his mother.
present

It is particularly

approached

Roberts

a

interesting that the officers
second

time,

after

receiving

permission to "look" in the vehicle to inform him they were going
to search the vehicle.

R. 57-58, 159.

B.
THERE EXISTED NO "REASONABLE FEAR" FOR
THEIR OWN SAFETY IN THE MIND OF THE LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS.
The officers, law enforcement and AP&P claimed to be concerned
for their safety, but that concern had to be "genuine."
does not support any such belief.

The record

At no time during this incident

was a person, not a law enforcement or AP&P officer, near the
vehicle and especially near with ability or potential of obtaining
anything

from

the

vehicle.

If

anything

supports

Defendant's

contention that the police officers were overreaching and/or over
reacting, it is their contention that they feared for their safety.
The

initial

responding

officer,

Mele,

radioed

for

back-up

immediately upon pulling into the drive behind what he believed was
the ATL vehicle.

Back up arrived very guickly.

door was answered promptly (within 30 seconds).

His knock at the
Before the passage

of any time the back up officers were scouting the vehicle.

While

it is possible they could see the weapons through the windows there
is no possibility these weapons in the vehicle were accessible to
4

anyone, especially Roberts, who at that time was being placed under
arrest by Officer Mele.

Roberts was then placed in a police

vehicle and told the vehicle was going to be searched.

At no time

did any officer, either at the scene, in the suppression hearing or
the trial articulate who presented any threat to their safety.
State vs. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992) as cited by
Appellee, is instructive herein.

In Bradford, this Court clearly

required that immediate control must be a possibility.

It would

clearly be stretching to say that Roberts could "break away from
police control."

It appears from the record that the officers

informed Roberts they were going to conduct this first weapons
search while he was sitting in the police vehicle with handcuffs
on.

R. 18-19.

Additionally, at this time, there were at least

three police officers, and perhaps two AP&P officers present,
securing the scene.

The State cites State vs. Cole, 674 P.2d 119

(Utah 1983) as helpful.

Indeed, certain elements of Cole show the

lack of justification in the officer's searches in the instant
case.

In Cole, there was a denial of the existence of any weapon,

and yet

the officer observed

one.

In the present

arrestee has acknowledged the existence of the weapon.

case, the
Drugs were

not a part of the encounter with Roberts, as they were with Cole.
In the case at bar, it appears that any volatility in the
situation decreased with time, rather than increased.

As time

progressed, more and more officers arrived at the scene.

Roberts

was arrested almost immediately.

As Pimental and then Defendant

were located, they too were arrested.
5

Never at any time did the

officers subject themselves to any challenge to their personal
safety in this situation.

As soon as a person was located, that

person was arrested.
If

any

portion

of

the

officer's

actions

were

clearly

erroneous, it was a belief that they were in harms way or subjected
to danger.

To base any ruling of exigent circumstances on this

belief would be clearly erroneous.

It is unknown whether this

formed the basis of the Trial Court's ruling however.

C.
DEFENDANT PRESERVED HIS CLAIM THAT
PROBABLE CAUSE DID NOT EXIST TO GIVE THE LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AN EXCEPTION TO THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT.
Defendant clearly contended, during the suppression hearing,
that the officers did not have probable cause to conduct such a
search.

Defendant argued at the hearing that if there was probable

cause to conduct the various searches, why not obtain a search
warrant.

No search warrant was ever obtained.

The clear intent of

this argument is that no probable cause existed.

To suggest.that

because the trial court did not mention the lack of probable cause
in its ruling

is to concede that the court did not find the

officers did not violate the Defendant's constitutional rights to
be free from search and seizure or that the Court found that the
AP&P officers didn't have reasonable suspicion to conduct a parolee
search because no explicit ruling was made on these issues either.
The court failed to make any explicit rulings, and merely found
"for the number of grounds stated..." that the motion was denied.
Defendant never conceded the existence of probable cause more
6

argued the issue more expressly than the Court expressly ruled
against him.

Defendant questioned why, if probable cause existed,

didn't the officer's obtain a warrant.

Since a warrant wasn't

sought, Defendant's argument is expressly that no probable cause
existed.

The Court was as likely to have ruled implicitly that no

probable cause existed as it was to have not explicitly ruled that
probable cause did exist.

POINT II

ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFICERS DID NOT
HAVE EITHER REASONABLE SUSPICION OR PROBABLE
CAUSE TO CONDUCT EITHER SEARCHES OF THE
RESIDENCE OR OF THE AUTOMOBILE.
The one thing that Defendant does concede is that a parolee
does have a diminished right to privacy.

Nevertheless, it is well

established, as cited in Defendant's brief in chief, that while
diminished, the rights to privacy and to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure still exist.
Roberts was arrested shortly after exiting the premise. While
the officers had information that Kinneman resided there, they had
no information he was home.
the residence.
three

Roberts denied that Kinneman was at

Kinneman did not fit the description of any of the

occupants

in

the

vehicle,

and

yet

determined to gain access to the residence.

the

officers

were

All the officers,

including the AP&P officers were restricted by the requirement of
having

reasonable

probationer.

suspicion

of

wrongdoing

on

the

part

of

a

The only probationer they knew was present was now in
7

custody.
house.

His suspected wrong doing was entirely outside of the
The possession of weapons was independent of the house.

There was no reasonable suspicion that Kinneman was home, nor was
there any reasonable suspicion that there were any weapons in the
house.

AP&P officers claim that parolees are not to associate with

criminals.

This requirement, however, is vague.

someone who has once committed a crime?

Is a criminal

This appears to be merely

a hook upon which an AP&P officer can hang a desire to conduct a
search barring any valid reason.

POINT III
The Defendant stands on his argument in his brief on point IV
of Defendant's Brief and of Appellant's Brief and declines to
further brief or respond to this point herein.

CONCLUSION
The Defendant has properly raised the issues, both at trial
and on appeal, that he argues.

The searches were illegal and

evidence obtained from the searches was tainted such that it should
have been suppressed.

Had the evidence from the searches been

suppressed, no conviction could have resulted.

j

Respectfully submitted this

day of March, 1995.

/

David M. Allred
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